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Towards a Multifunctional Grammar. ‘Language,
Reality and Mind’ in a Grammatical Description
Abstract
Previous grammars of the Russian language are written on the same methodological
background and with the same purpose and may therefore be characterized in their
entirety. It appears that they (1) are oriented towards the interpretive function, i.e. the
hearer, (2) describe the different parts of the grammar in isolation without internal
connection, (3) lack a contrastive element and finally (4) incorporate only written
sources. In that respect previous grammars fail and cannot live up to what could be
called modern standards. Against this background a new type of grammar is proposed -
a grammar which (1) takes the speaker into consideration, (2) differentiates three types
of “wrongness”, (3) views the Russian language as a specific member of a linguistic
supertype which is opposed to two other supertypes, and (4) takes its starting point in
speech production, i.e. in oral discourse. After a theoretical discussion several pieces of
evidence will be presented in favour of such type of grammar.
1. The traditional approach in Russian grammar
Although new grammars are written in order to compensate for short-
comings experienced with previous grammars, they need not include a
new framework or be based on totally new principles. In fact, it appears
that relatively new grammars of the Russian language (e.g. Wade 1992,
Mathiassen 1990, Christensen 1992, Švedova & Lopatin 1989) do not
distinguish themselves in any way from previous grammars (Isačenko
1975, Mulisch 1975, TJAG 1979, AG 1980). It seems - more or less -
as if the new grammars are echoes of their predecessors with an
admixture of modern pedagogical principles, which need not be an
improvement if simplicity supersedes insightfulness. In the following I
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shall attempt to describe what the above- mentioned grammars have in
common from the point of view methodology and current grammatical
practice. Although I will confine my criticism to Russian grammars, I
think that the four characteristics to be examined below are applicable
to grammars of other languages as well.
1.1. The orientation towards interpretation
A grammar may be used in two ways: to interpret or to produce spoken
or written utterances. All existing grammars of the Russian language
are constructed solely on an interpretive basis which means that they
take their starting point in reception (comprehension). An interpretively
oriented grammar takes some data as input, e.g. an utterance involving
the perfective aspect, and yields a meaning as output, e.g. an action
viewed in its totality. In other words, an interpretation can be said to
have the form of an inductive inference:
When testing what will be called the interpretive power of a
grammar one could set up three requirements corresponding to the
three boxes. The descriptions resulting from an interpretively adequate
grammar should be (1) exhaustive, i.e. it should be suited to handle all
data; (2) unequivocal, i.e. at best, the same rule or feature should be
applied to all data or, at least, the reader should know which rules
should be applied to which data; and (3) meaningful, i.e. it should give
interpretations that are relevant and precise in meaning (translations to
the readers’ mothertongue are not enough to satisfy this requirement). It
is not my intention here to go into further details with respect to the
three requirements - I only want to point out that it is extremely difficult
- if not totally impossible - for a grammar to satisfy the last two
mentioned requirements if it is hearer-oriented. In order to satisfy
requirements (2) and (3) we need a speaker-oriented grammatical
component with a speaker-related notion as intention, i.e. the notion
that corresponds to the pragmatic notion of sense (mening in Danish).
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1.2. The atomistic mode of presentation
It goes without saying that any existing grammar has been written on
certain principles which together can be said to form the leitmotif of the
entire grammar. In our case it is quite evident that all are based on struc-
turalist principles, where one of the most important principles says that
language constitutes a structured whole in which everything is tied to-
gether. This leading principle of structuralism is not, however, reflected
in traditional grammars. In other words, the verbal categories of tense,
aspect, and mood might be described in the same structuralist feature
framework, but you will not find the description that tells you how the
three verbal categories form a structured whole and how they are tied
together. In general, the different parts of the Russian language are de-
scribed in isolation and without internal coherence. Not only verbal, but
also nominal categories such as gender, animacy, number and case are
described as if they had no relation to one another - as if they did not ex-
hibit any hierarchical relations whatsoever. The reader is not told - nei-
ther explicitly nor implicitly by order of presentation - whether aspect
operates on tense or vice versa and which category is the basic one. In
the same way the reader is not informed about the lexical-grammatical
structure of verbs and nouns, and where lexical meaning could fit in a
grammatical description. The order of presentation seems to be gov-
erned by the pedagogical principle of simplicity: what appears to be
simple comes at first, what appears to be complicated comes at the end.
In that way aspect, which is considered to be the most complicated
category, may be treated as the final category (cf. Mathiassen 1990) - an
order of presentation which makes sense only from the point of view of
the layman, not from the point of view of the Russian language.
1.3. The firm belief in Universal Grammar
Modern linguists from the theories of Government and Binding across
Functional Grammar to Cognitive Linguistics believe in what is
normally called Universal Grammar (UG). According to this view all
languages are grounded on the same basic structures and principles, are
concrete manifestations of something invariant. The ultimate goal of
linguistics is to account for UG and to describe and explain the various
paths that can be taken by various languages. Although the three
linguistic schools just mentioned have not yet created a total description
of a single language from A to Z, the same underlying idea is found in
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ordinary grammars. From the very descriptions and their conceptual
apparatus it appears that grammarians take the Latin language (or the
English language in a more extreme variant) as a kind of standard. The
result is that the English and Russian tense-aspect-mood systems are
described on the same basis. This leaves almost no room for differences
between these two languages - contrastive analyses are kept at a
minimum and often constrained to ad-hoc explanations. The heavy
reliance on the old Latin tradition may also explain why only purely
linguistic knowledge is taken as a possible framework of explanation.
Neither extralinguistic knowledge (e.g. social rules) or interdisciplinary
knowledge (e.g. psycholinguistic experiments) are taken into account.
1.4. The primacy of written sources
As already pointed out, traditional grammars are not only oriented
towards the interpretive function, but also composed on the basis of
samples of data taken from written sources. The data chosen, which are
often picked out with great care from the very best authors of the last
quarter of the 19th century, are necessarily grammatical, acceptable and
appropriate. The one-sided, but quite understandable emphasis on well-
known and generally accepted material has several interrelated
consequences. First of all, this type of grammar will not include
examples from ordinary oral discourse - data which often differ in
several respects from data from written discourse and which often
would be more helpful for the student learning the foreign language.
Secondly, this type of grammar operates - if it operates at all - with an
extremely vaguely defined distinction between grammaticality and
ungrammaticality - as if it was no concern of the grammar to explain
why, when and in what way a sentence can be said to be grammatical or
ungrammatical. This is of course necessary if the grammar is to reflect
the grammar possessed by people who have the language as their first
language.
2. The new approach in theory
2.1. The interpretive and predictive function of a grammar
There is a significant difference between a grammar that interprets
utterances and a grammar that produces utterances. As just indicated,
78
when a grammar interprets utterances from written discourse, they will
be grammatical, acceptable and appropriate. When a grammar is to
produce an utterance, it must adopt the speaker’s position. In other
words, it must account for the possibilities of selection and for the
choice of grammatical forms in terms of the speaker’s intentions, the
knowledge derivable from the external situation or setting, and the
background knowledge of the hearer, as well as the relationship
between the speaker and the hearer. Thus, it does not necessarily follow
that an interpretively adequate grammar is productively adequate, too.
It is not necessarily capable of distinguishing grammatical and
ungrammatical, acceptable and unacceptable, and appropriate and
inappropriate outputs. (I here follow Hymes 1971 to a certain extent;
for other views see Robin Lakoff 1977, van Dijk 1977, and Chomsky
1965:11ff.) A productively oriented grammar takes a certain intention
as input and yields an utterance as output. In other words, speech
production takes the form of a deductive inference:
A grammar which is interpretively as well as productively adequate
should thus adopt the three way distinction presented above and should
be capable of defining why and when an utterance or a text is
ungrammatical (which has something to do with its external relation to
reality as well as with its internal relation to other utterances),
unacceptable (which has something to do with its relation to the
hearer), or inappropriate (which has something to do with its relation to
the speaker, i.e. his intention).
2.2. The holistic approach
It goes without saying that we need a psychological component in order
to be able to talk about intentions and we need some tools to describe
how intentions are formed and in which sort of language they are
encoded. Since GB-theory sees no distinction whatsoever between
linguistic grammar and mental grammar, i.e. between language and
mind, and since Cognitive Linguistics identifies apperception
(involving all senses) with perception (involving only the sense of
vision), there is really no help to find in linguistics. I believe that there
is a universal mental language which has its own grammar - the mental
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grammar of the human mind. All other things being equal, people are
borne with the same cognitive abilities which are evoked during
childhood in much the same way regardless of speech community
membership. The universal mental grammar is viewed as involving
three different levels of representation. In other words, according to this
view the same part of reality is represented in three different ways
corresponding to the three different levels. It is thus the child’s coupling
of data with either of the three levels of mental representation that is
responsible for the different types of grammar. Let me briefly examine
what I consider to form the basic structure of the human mind. We shall
take our point of departure in two different types of situation: (1)
simple situations, i.e. states and activities, and (2) complex situations,
i.e. events and processes. The two simple situations are identified on a
perceptual basis - activities evoke unstable pictures, but states do not -
in opposition to the complex situations, viz. events and processes which
cannot be identified on a perceptual basis. I define an event as a change
of state caused by an activity and a process as an activity intending
to cause a change of state. As we see, an event and a process are
exactly made up by the two simple situations, i.e. by an activity and a
state. 
2.2.1. The structure of the human mind  
The first level: Identification
All people can identify an event, i.e. a state (q) caused by an activity (p),
without having seen the activity itself. It is enough to have at your
disposal two opposite pieces of information about the same thing/-
person (ground) in order to identify an event. If you know that there is
nothing on your table (¬ q) and then suddenly see a vase with flowers
standing on the very same table (q), then you will know that this cannot
be true in the same world. Therefore you will conclude that the state
situation “there is nothing on the table” (¬ q) is true of a past world,
whereas the state situation “there is a vase with flowers on the table” (q)
is true of a present world. In fact you have identified a change of state
caused by some activity since you know that no change of state (i.e.
from ¬ q to q) can take place without it having been caused by some
activity (cf. von Wright 1974). This is all done automatically and
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subconsciously on the basis of what I call the event-instruction (see
fig.1). An event is thus identified and experienced indirectly without
you seeing the activity itself. You may also identify a process, i.e. an
activity (p) intending to cause a new state (q). A process is experienced
forwards, since you must see an activity in order to be able to infer that
there is a certain intention underlying the production of that activity.
This is done on the basis of receiving an unstable picture on your
perceptual screen. Let us imagine that you see your mother carrying a
vase with flowers. You identify an activity by receiving an unstable
picture. But this is not enough to identify a process. You have to be able
to see that your mother is walking towards a certain table and conclude
from this background that she has the intention of putting the flowers on
the table. This need not turn out to be true in view of the fact that she
may turn left and put them on the window sill instead. But if it turns out
to be true then the identified proces becomes an event which is directly
experienced. This means that the event instruction gives a correct
output in all cases, whereas the process instruction does not garantee a
correct output: it involves an abductive element, i.e. pure guessing.
Fig.1: The “skeletal” structure of the human mind
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The second level: Assimilation
Now the identified event or process has to be assimilated, i.e.
interiorized into the human mind. The assimilation is provided by the
mental models of events and processes (cf. fig.1). Such mental models,
which are generalized, abstract copies of concrete events and processes
of reality, must exist because without them we could not account for the
fact that in the case of an identified event an unobserved past activity
suddenly becomes part of our human mind and in the case of an
identified process it is an unobservable future state that suddenly
becomes part of our human mind in the shape of an imagined state. We
cannot possibly explain this without assuming that people have at their
disposal generalized copies of these complex situations, i.e. mental
models of events and processes. In other words, at the level of mental
models identified events and processes - of which you have actually
seen only one of two parts - are internalized into the human mind as
complete structures. 
The third level: Storing
After having assimilated an identified event or an identified process
people must store them in order to be able to assimilate new events and
processes and in order to be able to recall or visualize them, and to talk
about them later on. From the point of view of normal human abilities
at least two different kinds of mental stores must be available to the
human mind: one of the past world and another of the present world.
This must be the case since people are capable of differentiating past
experiences which have no present effects and those which have. For
instance, If we stick to the flower-scene and presume that you have
experienced the event indirectly, i.e. identified it backwards, you know
that the state situation “there is a vase with flowers on the table” obtains
in the present world, whereas the activity that lead to the present state
does not obtain anymore, i.e. it is, and will always be in the past. The
event can and will only be stored as a photograph in the present world
store - you have not seen the activity which would have left a film in the
past world store. If the event was directly experienced, i.e. identified as
a process which later turns into an event, then you will have it stored as
a film in the past world store - you actually saw the activity component
- but also as a photograph in the present world store, because the state
situation “there is a vase with flowers on the table” still obtains. When
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the vase is removed, the flowers thrown out or the vase is broken, the
photograph in question will be “burnt”: the original situation is gone
and therefore the copy taken from the original has to be removed from
the present world store to the past world store.
The important and interesting thing about this is that the three levels
reflect three different mental representations of the very same event and
process: (1) at the level of instructions people identify events or
processes either directly or indirectly; (2) at the level of mental models
people assimilate or interiorize the identified event and process by
using the mental models of events and processes, respectively; and (3)
at the level of stores people store the assimilated events and processes
in the present and past world stores, respectively. It it my hypothesis
that languages may choose to verbalize either of these three levels of
mental representation. In other words, a language may choose to
verbalize what has been directly and indirectly experienced, or to
verbalize the mental models which are generalized copies of reality or
to verbalize the past and present world stores. Whatever a language
chooses to do, the grammatical outcome will be quite distinct from the
other two possibilities.
2.2.2. Linguistic functions and linguistic supertypes
If we compare these three established levels of the human mind to
Bühler’s Organon Model (cf. Bühler 1933), it appears that there is a
clear connection (see fig. 2). Bühler operates only with three so-called
language functions in opposition to Jakobson and Halliday who ope-
rated with up to seven different functions thus - as I see it - confusing
the notion of language function with the notion of speech function.
Each function is attached to one of the three obligatory participants of
any communication situation, viz. the speaker who has a message, the
hearer for whom the information is intended and objects and situations
of reality which can be said to be carried by the linguistic notions of
words and sentences. The expressive function is thus defined in rela-
tion to the speaker, the appeal function in relation to the hearer and the
representative function in relation to external reality. The three
language functions correspond not only to the three traditionally
recognized sign types, viz. symptom, signal and symbol (cf.fig.2), but
also to the hierarchical structure of the human mind just examined
above (cf. fig.1). Thus, on the basis of Bühler’s Organon Model (1933)
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and on the basis of the three levels of representation (for further infor-
mation, see Durst-Andersen 1992: 81-96) I suggest that the gramma-
tical categories of any single language and their formal coding are
designed to capture primarily one of the following: (1) the speaker’s
encoding of message, (2) the information which is intended for the
hearer and which is decoded by the hearer, or (3) situations in
referential reality which are represented in the hearer as well as in the
speaker. This yields three linguistic supertypes: (1) speaker-based
languages like Georgian and Turkish (level one), (2) hearer-based
languages like English and Danish (level three), and (3) reality-based
languages like Russian and the informal version of French (level two).
Each such supertype has its own core category - speaker-based lan-
guages have a mood distinction between direct and indirect experience,
hearer-based languages have a tense distinction between flash-back
(old information) and news-flash (new information), and reality-based
languages have an aspectual distinction between events and processes
(see fig.3). Each core category which determines the entire core system,
thereby creating internal harmony among its members. The internal
harmony is not only argued to be a fact inside other verbal categories,
but also inside nominal categories because the nominal system appears
to be isomorphic with respect to the verbal one (see below). If this holds
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Fig. 2: Bühler’s Organon Model
true, then we have an explanation of the fact that when looking at the
grammatical categories of the Russian and the English languages it is
not possible to find a single common category - it is either the case that
a category is present in one language (e.g. definite and indefinite article
in English or case in Russian), but absent in the other, or the case that a
category in one language (e.g. aspect, tense, and mood in English) is
completely different from that of the other language - i.e. what seems to
be the same because they have the same name cannot be put under the
same heading and therefore do not fit into the same structure (see also
Durst-Andersen 1993/94).
Fig.3: The three linguistic supertypes
Supertypes and form vs. substance
Although the notion of linguistic supertype is new, it appears that the
idea of making a distinction between type (supertype in my terminol-
ogy) and system is not new at all. In 1965 Coseriu proposed a tetratomy
of language, i.e. a four-way distinction, which included type, system,
norm, and speech (cf. Coseriu 1965). By so doing, Coseriu split the
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parts: (1) type which has something to do with principles of organi-
zation, (2) system which is the materialization of some more or less
abstract principles into rules, and (3) norm which is the normal reali-
zation of the rules. This means that some principles can be organised or
weighed differently and the result will be different systems, and in the
same way a certain system, which is in fact something potential, can
manifest itself in many ways, but one of them is the normal one. Let us
say that is possible to distinguish between consonantal and vocalic lan-
guages (cf. Andersen 1978), i.e. between two different types. Russian
and Polish would be consonantal languages because they both have the
largest number of phonological distinctions inside the consonants.
Their phonological systems are, however, different, since the interpre-
tation of the principles have resulted in different rules. The Russian
system has several manifestations - i-kan’e vs. je-kan’e, a-kan’e vs. o-
kan’e, etc. - where it is possible to find the normal realization (which is
i-kan’e and a-kan’e). The norm can only be found by looking at the
substance, i.e. speech in Coseriu’s terminology. In other words, at the
substance level Saussure’s notion parole equals Coseriu’s speech. 
From this the conclusion to be drawn is that although two languages
belong to the same linguistic supertype (or type in Coseriu’s termi-
nology), they may manifest themselves in two different systems. In the
former case we are dealing with identical principles, in the latter case
we are dealing with different interpretations which result in different
rules. By looking at a particular system of a specific linguistic super-
type (e.g. Russian as a member of reality-based languages) and by com-
paring it with a specific system of another linguistic supertype (e.g.
English as a member of hearer-based languages), we automatically get
a contrastive element. In other words, the proposed theory of linguistic
supertypes is a holistic typology which ensures that it is the entire
system of L2 that is compared to the entire system of L1. This is crucial,
since only in that way it will be possible to convey the “biological
nature” of the language to foreign students. (For a “total-grammatical”
approach, see Hawkins 1986 and Müller-Gotoma 1992.)
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3. The new approach in practice
3.1. Word-for-word vs. sentence-for-sentence translation
Let us take an illustrative example and let us test how this kind of gram-
mar operates. Let us imagine that some Danish students have been
assigned the task of translating the short story “Buketten” by Leck
Fischer into Russian. The first sentence to be translated is the follow-
ing:
(1) Der blev banket på døren ‘There was a knocking at the door.’
there-adv knock-pas-pret on door-def
From my own experience as both a student and a teacher of Russian I
know that the Danish student will not have the faintest idea of what to
do with that sentence: there is no grammar and there is no dictionary
that might be helpful. He will probably start by taking the dictionary
and try to look under the entry der ‘there’; make some inquiries about
passives in a Russian grammar; once again look into the dictionary to
get some help to translate the preposition på ‘on’; and finally consult
the grammar again to find the exact case form to be used in the given
utterance. This approach where the student analyses and translates in
components, i.e. word for word, is completely wrong from the point of
view of the Russian language - one might argue that it actually jumps
over the Russian grammar. As a reality-based language, Russian is
designed to capture situations in reality. In view of the fact that the
Danish language is designed to capture the information intended for the
hearer, the student has to imagine which situation he thinks is referred
to by (1), i.e. he has to choose one of several interpretations correspon-
ding to different situations. The Danish student would be able to arrive
at the “relevant” interpretation by deciding on the following variables:
- Type of situation (state, activity or action)? → activity verb (stučat’)
- Past or present activity? → past activity (-l)
- Presentation of the activity (act, process or event)? → event (pf)
- Duration of activity itself (short, too long, without interruption)? →
short (po-)
- Individuation of agent (agent specification or not)? → none (-i)
- Is the activity vertically or horizontrally directed? → vertically (v)
- Is it permanent or is sporadic contact? → sporadic (acc)
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All these question should be asked and answered in order to arrive at
the Russian utterance which can be said to match the most likely
interpretation of the Danish utterance in the given context. In that way
we get (1’).
(1’) Po-stuča-l-i v dver’-Ø
pf-knock/ACT-pret-plur in door-acc
The Russian utterance has the following semantics: “Somebody who is
not important to our story went from producing two or three knocks at
a vertically placed door to not producing knocks”. As should be
evident, although in principle the Russian utterance talks about the
same situation as the original Danish utterance, they cannot be said to
be a hundred percent identical in meaning - on the contrary. The Danish
language acts as an appeal to the hearer/reader and is designed to
capture the distinction between new and old information at various
levels. Der ‘there’ signals a so-called presentative sentence, i.e.
introduces a new frame of reference (a new story or a new part of an old
story), the simple past form shows that this part of the story is presented
as a flash-back, and the blive-passive that it is shown as a film (not
presented as information bites). Note that the Danish utterance says
nothing about the activity component. It could be a single act, two or
three knocks or in principle an ongoing knocking activity. Only the
reader or the hearer can decide what it looked like. In other words,
external reality is treated as something that the reader has to construct
for himself - in direct contrast to the Russian language.
3.2. Translation and interdisciplinary knowledge
If we go a little bit further down the text it turns out that some person
had come to deliver some flowers to Mrs. Elly. These flowers are
however received by her husband. At the point where he shouts to her
that the flowers are for her, we realize that it is not sufficient for the
student to have the “valid” grammar, he must also possess knowledge
about social rules of the Russian society and be capable of applying
textlinguistic notions:
(2) “De er til dig”. Hun afbrød ikke arbejdet ‘They are for you! - She
(Mrs.Elly) didn’t stop her work.’
The question is how to translate the negated utterance. Normally it is
recommended by Russian grammars that the imperfective aspect
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should be used when the potential agent did not do anything. I made an
experiment with Russian native speakers who master the Danish
language in which I asked them to translate the negated utterance. First
I did not show them the continuation of the text. All chose the
perfective aspect and said that the imperfective sentence would be
ungrammatical:
(3) On-a ne prerva-l-a svoj-u rabot-u
she-nom neg stop/pf-pret-fem her-acc work-acc
Then I showed them the entire text where it is stated that Mrs. Elly did
not stop her work because she did not want to receive the flowers - her
husband had sent them in order to calm her down (he had been fooling
around with another woman). At that point they all changed opinion
and said that the perfective sentence was ungrammatical. Why did they
change their opinion? In the first case they chose on the basis of their
knowledge of social rules. When women are brought flowers, they are
supposed to behave according to the rule saying that they should stop
whatever they are doing in order to be able to receive the flowers - the
opposite would be impolite. In other words, it was presupposed that
Mrs. Elly was obligated to stop her work. This specific type of presup-
position can be conveyed only by the perfective aspect. When the
Russian informants realized that she in fact did not want to receive the
flowers, they changed opinion because only the imperfective aspect
implies that the potential agent did not want to do anything (see 3a).
(3a) Ona ne preryvala (ipf) svoju rabotu.
A normal grammar which does not operate with social rules, expecta-
tions and textlinguistic notions would not be able to handle this kind of
data. 
3.3. Semantically different, but pragmatically identical
Although languages belong to different supertypes, it does not neces-
sarily follow that it is totally impossible to bring differently construc-
ted grammars under the same heading. Let us take an illustative exam-
ple. In Russian there are a perfective as well as an imperfective imper-
ative which are used to issue MANDS at the expence of indirect speech
acts, which are used far more often in Danish than in Russian, but in
Danish less frequently than in English, where in most cases direct
speech acts would imply something like a military command (e.g. Sit!,
89
Go!, Get up!, etc.). These differences have something to do with the
fact that Russian, on the one hand, and English and Danish on the other,
are grounded on a completely different semantic basis (they belong to
different supertypes), and with the fact that English and Danish are dif-
ferent manifestations of the same supertype, i.e. have different rules al-
though founded on the same principles (for a cultural explanation, see
Wierzbicka 1991). However, by looking at various parameters at a
higher level it is possible to find correlations and make them fit into the
same pragmatic framework. In that way it turns out that it is possible to
describe (a) the use of aspect in connection with the Russian imperative
mood, (b) the use of Danish “modalizers” (i.e. modal particles) in con-
nection with imperative sentences, and (c) the use of indirect speech
acts in English (see fig.4). From the pragmatically defined conditions
inside what is here called “The Instructions for Directives” it appears
that the major condition is whether the speaker considers the hearer to
be cooperative or not. If he decides YES (either because the hearer de-
sires the same state as the speaker does or because he wants to be
helpful with regard to the speaker’s desire), the speaker must decide
whether it is true or false that the hearer dares to produce the required
activity. If he decides YES, he will use the perfective aspect in Russian,
the LIGE-particle in Danish, and “Will you...?” in English. If he de-
cides NO, then he will use the imperfective aspect in Russian, the
BARE-particle in Danish, and “Won’t you...?” in English. If the speak-
er decides that the hearer is not cooperative (because the hearer hesi-
tates to perform the requested activity), he must decide whether it is
true or false that the hearer desires the same state as he does. If he de-
cides YES, he will use the perfective aspect with the že-particle in
Russian, the NU-particle in Danish, and “Can’t you...!” in English. If
he decides NO (i.e. the hearer hesitates to produce the activity, simply
because he does not desire the state which will obtain if he produces
the activity), he will use the imperfective aspect with the the že-particle
in Russian, the SÅ-particle in Danish, and “Will you...!” in English. It
appears that Russian distinguishes between deontic and alethic mo-
dality by means of aspect and between polite and impolite uses by
means of particle and/or intonation, that Danish distinguishes between
the various deontic and alethic modes by means of different particles
(“modalizers”), and English distinguishes between polite and impolite
uses by means of “sentence mode” — interrogative sentences sig-
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nalling politeness, whereas declarative sentences with inversion of
subject-predicate signal impoliteness.
Fig.4: Instructions for Directives
Although different social rules may interfere and cause some local
mismatches in the above-mentioned correlations, it ought to be clear
that we have some simple tools to make foreign speakers learn to
produce grammatical utterances which are simultaneously appropriate
from the point of view of the speaker, as well as acceptable from the
point of view of the hearer.
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3.4. Scenario descriptions and oral discourse
Another way of making the grammar more suited to satisfy the
predictive function of a grammar is to use scenario descriptions where
the student/reader has to choose the utterance that fits the description:
Scenario description 1: The hospital scene
An old lady is standing in front of a couple of chairs in a hospital hall
and is not sure if she may sit down as she wants. You, who are a doctor,
passes her and observes her uncertainty. In order to make her sit down
you say:
(4a) Sæt Dem lige ned!
SIT YOU JUST DOWN
(4b) Sæt Dem nu ned!
SIT YOU NOW DOWN
(4c) Sæt Dem så ned!
SIT YOU THEN DOWN
(4d) Sæt dem bare ned!
SIT YOU MERELY DOWN
If we assume that the task was given to a student who chose the right
one, viz. (4d), he might have explained it in the following way. In the
situation described there is really no choice in Danish, simply because
all examples from (a) to (c) will imply that they are uttered in the
doctor’s own interest, which is wrong according to the scenario
description. Only (d) makes sense: the old lady needs a permission from
a person who has the right authority and (d) with bare involves the
necessary licence and is uttered in the interest of the old lady. Bare
‘merely’ is thus a prescriptive modalizer, the function of which is to
issue a permission and by doing that to satisfy the hearer’s precondition
for complying with the speaker’s request. Such scenario descriptions
will not only help the student to produce speech, but at the same time
ensure that we do not forget oral communication and oral language
(which is so poorly represented in ordinary grammars).
4. The grammar itself - evidence from Russian
One of the advantages of relying on the notion of linguistic supertype is
that we can explain why, for instance, the Russian and English lan-
guages do not have a single category in common. Russian has aspect,
but it differs fundamentally from English aspect (the difference be-
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tween the perfective and imperfective aspect is learnt by the Russian
child in the past tense, whereas the difference between the progressive
and non-progressive aspect is learnt by the English child in the present);
Russian has tense, but it differs fundamentally from English tense in the
sense that Russian tense talks about past or present situations, while
English tense talks about past and present worlds, i.e. people/things are
located in two different kinds of universe; etc. In addition to that,
Russian has a whole arsenal of formalized categories which are simply
absent in English (e.g. case, animacy, mood, etc.) just as the English
language has (e.g. definiteness, it- and there-sentences, it- and there-
cleft sentences, etc.). In the same way, it becomes clear why it is
difficult - if not impossible - for Russian students to learn to speak and
write correct English as well as to comprehend oral and written English
discourse, and, conversely, for English students to learn to speak and
write correct Russian as well as to comprehend oral and written
discourse. By saying - as we did above - that there is a determining
category, i.e. a category that governs the entire system, we automatic-
ally get the idea that some categories are more important than others.
This is, of course, extremely important for acquiring a second language
and should be reflected in any grammar. This brings us to the question
of the hierarchical organization of verbal and nominal categories and to
the question of isomorphism between the structure of the verbal and the
nominal systems.
4.1. The verbal categories and their internal structure
In 2.1. we talked about state (q-classifiers), activity (p-classifiers) and
action verbs (p-and-q-classifiers). Normally they are called verb classes
or aktionsarten outside the Russian tradition. Without going into further
detail I shall say that these three classes comprise an important
grammatical category which has been overlooked so far. The function
of this verbal category can be said to be equivalent to gender and for
that reason I shall call it verbal gender (VG). In this way, the Russian
language can be said to have three verbal genders - state verbs which
create a single ground-proposition involving a state description, activity
verbs which create a single ground-proposition involving an activity
description, and action verbs which create two ground-propositions -
one involving an activity description and another involving a state
description. Due to the fact that state and activity verbs involve single
93
ground-propositions, but action verbs two ground-propositions the
former can be termed simplex verbs and the latter complex verbs.
What is then the function of verbal gender? Its function is best under-
stood in metaphorical terms. It can be said to create an IMAGE-IDEA
PAIR, i.e. something potential which has not yet been actualized and
reached the real world. For instance, both the perfective and imper-
fective action verb dat’(pf)/davat’(ipf) ‘give’ create two ideas in the
form of two ground-propositions, viz. X DO SOMETHING (p) and Y
EXIST WITH Z (q), both being coupled to two corresponding images -
one being unstable where X is doing something with Y and another
being stable where Y is with Z. In that way we get a complex IMAGE-
IDEA PAIR or a verb model of actions. The common meaning of the
two aspectual forms in Russian is therefore not to be found in an auto-
nomous component like the English verb “to give”, but in the common
root //da//-. Aspect (A) operates on the output structure of the category
of verbal gender, and by doing that it can be said to create a copy of
reality. An action as such is not found in reality: it is not possible to find
a world where the activity of the action “X BRING Y TO Z” obtains at
the same time as does the state of the action - either it must be the case
that X did something that caused Y to be with Z (an event), or it must
be the case that X is doing something in order to cause Y to be with Z
(a process). This means that an action is a construct or a metaconcept of
events and processes - just as it is not possible to find a human being as
such: it will either be a male or a female variant. In other words, aspect
brings reality into the picture and therefore we should no longer speak
about X and Y, but about concrete human beings as Grigorij and things
as a certain book. The function of the perfective aspect is to show to the
hearer a concrete copy of an event, whereas the function of the
imperfective aspect is to show a copy of a process (an action cannot
create a copy at all because there is no original in our external reality).
The category of tense (T) operates on the output structure of aspect
(copy) and by doing so places the original in reality, i.e. either before or
simultaneously with the moment of speech. The category of mood (M)
operates on the output structure of tense (original) and by doing so
assigns the relation of equality or non-equality between the copy and
the original. Indicative assigns the relation of equality and thus indi-
cates that we are dealing with true reference, i.e according to the
speaker there is or was such a situation in reality. The two non-
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indicative forms assign the relation of non-equality. The subjunctive
mood treats the lack of equality as a matter of fact, i.e. it cannot be
changed. The imperative mood treats it as matter to be changed, i.e. the
hearer is asked by the speaker to create an original on the basis of the
copy (see fig.5).
This is the best way to explain the hierarchical structure and internal
functioning of the system of verbal categories in Russian. It shows that
verbal gender is a lexico-grammatical category, that aspect is a propo-
sitional-semantic category, that tense is a referential-semantic cate-
gory and that mood is a relational-semantic category. This hierarchical
structure is iconically reflected in the segmentational structure of
morphemes: 
(5) give-pf-pret-subj
da - Ø - l - by “(he) should have given (it)’
VG - A - T - M
4.2. The nominal categories and their internal structure
The point is that the structure of the nominal system is isomorphic with
respect to the structure of the verbal system - the former is a
diagrammatization of the latter. This means that the four verbal
categories mentioned above have their exact equivalents in the nominal
system. Thus it seems to be no coincidence that the Russian language
consists of four verbal categories as well as four nominal categories,
viz. gender (NG), animacy (A), number (N) and case (C). A look at the
order of the involved nominal morphemes should provide us with an
idea of the hierachical structure on the level of content:
(6) bror - pl- gen
brat - j - ov
G/A  - N - C
Just as verbal gender and verbal aspect, nominal gender and animacy
inherently belong to the stem, whereas the remaining two categories
belong to morphological endings. Nominal gender also creates an




a prototypical description of a “mouse” paired to a protypical picture of
a “mouse”. Nominal gender is thus a lexico-grammatical category.
The function of the category of animacy can be compared to the
function of verbal aspect, since it operates on the output structure of
gender and by so doing shows the hearer a concrete copy of a “mouse”
- in the case of an animate mouse the hearer is shown a normal living
mouse (see 7a), in the case of an inanimate mouse (see 7b) the hearer is
shown a computer mouse.
(7a) ja uvidel dvux myšej ‘I saw two (genuine) mice’.
I see-pf-pret two-gen-pl mouse-gen-pl
(7b) ja uvidel dve myši ‘I saw two (computer) mice’.
I see-pf-pret two-acc-pl mouse-acc-pl
The former will create a potentially unstable copy (“agentiveness”), the
latter will create a stable copy (“passiveness”). In other words, the
category of animacy/inanimacy could be termed an ideational-seman-
tic category. The category of number operates on the output structure
of the category of animacy and by so doing it places the original (for
instance, two mice) in reality. In that respect its function is comparable
to that of tense and can be named a referential-semantic category.
Case is equivalent to mood and is thus a relational-semantic category
in the sense that it shows the hearer whether there is a relation of
equality or not between the copy showed by the category of animacy
and the original placed in reality by the category of number (see fig.6).
Direct cases, i.e. the nominative and accusative cases, function as the
direct mood form, viz. the indicative form. They assign the relation of
equality and thus signal that the person or thing denoted by the noun is
indeed present in the situation described by the verb (I call this local
reference). All other cases are oblique and assign lack of equality. The
vocative case, which is included in the Russian case system because of
its productivity (cf. Bily!1990), functions as the imperative mood: it
treats the lack of equality as matter to be changed, whereas the re-
maining three cases (the genitive, dative and instrumental cases) treat




seems to correspond to the distinction between objective mood (the
genitive) and subjective mood (the dative and the instrumental).
The grammar just described is capable of explaining what is
inexplicable in ordinary grammars (if mentioned at all): in Russian we
have to use the subjunctive mood in connection with the genitive case
in the following utterance (the indicative mood will be ungrammatical):
(8) Na Ukraine net ni odnogo goroda (gen), kotoryj ne golodal by
(subjunctive) vo vremja vojny ‘There is no town (gen) that did
not suffer (subjunctive) from hunger during World War Two.’
We can explain this phenomenon as a kind of harmony: because there
is no local reference the genitive case is obligatory and by opening up
an internal world of imagination, the speaker must continue to speak in
the same terms and therefore has to choose the subjunctive mood which
also assigns the relation of non-equality between the copy and the
original. The distinction between local and non-local reference inside
the Russian case system is also found in the pronominal system where
pronouns with -to and ničego assign local reference, whereas pronouns
with -nibud’ and nečego assign non-local reference.
3.3. Lexicon - grammar - communication: nom. vs. instr.
As already pointed out, ordinary grammars only seldomly mention
lexical meaning. This is a pity, since a certain grammatical way of
thinking must reveal itself at all levels of language - also at the level of
lexicon. Let me illustrate this by using the category of animacy vs.
inanimacy, which plays a far more important role in the Russian lan-
guage than normally acknowledged by grammarians. The grammatical
distinction is instantiated in the lexicon as two different words for the
English word corpse, viz. mertvec ‘animate’ and trup ‘inanimate’. At
an even higher level of abstraction the grammatical and lexical
distinction can be explained in religious terms: according to orthodox
religious thinking the soul leaves the human body only after 40 days.
This creates the need for two different kinds of the notion “corpse”.
Owing to the exclusion of lexical meaning, traditional grammars
actually have nothing substantial to say about the combination of
lexical and grammatical meaning. This phenomenon seems to be rather
important, since, for instance, (9a) is grammatical, while (9b) is
ungrammatical.
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(9a) On-Ø by-l-Ø orël-Ø ‘He was an eagle’ (i.e. extremely good).
human-M be-pret-M eagle-nom-sg
(9b) *On-Ø by-l-Ø orl-om ‘He was an eagle’ (i.e. a certain bird).
pron-M be-pret-M eagle-instr
This is strange, because normally both forms are equally grammatical.
The point is, of course, that the instrumental case categorizes the man
as an eagle, which is impossible when we are dealing with all normal
worlds and - I emphasize - this is what grammars do and should do. In
a normal world a male person is a human being and not an animal of a
certain kind. This means that in a non-normal world where a certain
person participates in a carneval fancilly dressed as an eagle the
utterance (9b) becomes grammatical (this is the only kind context that
can make it grammatical - I thank Michael Herslund for having made
this observation). The nominative case characterizes him as an eagle,
i.e. says that he is a person who has the quality of an eagle. This is
possible, since it involves only the connotative aspects of the noun. In
other examples it is not the question of grammaticality, but rather the
question of acceptability (see 10 and 11).
(10) †On-Ø by-l-Ø datčanin-om ‘He was a Dane’.
pron-M be-pret-M Dane-instr
(11) †Pǔskin-Ø by-l-Ø poét-om ‘Pushkin was a poet’.
Pushkin-M be-pret-M poet-instr
In other words, both examples are grammatical - there is nothing wrong
about what they denote - nevertheless they sound odd and are - if
pronounced by foreigners - clearly marked as grammatical mistakes.
What is at play? They are both instances of what I would call
“communication-overrules-grammar”. The important thing is that
the lexical meaning of “Dane” itself is a categorization of certain per-
sons and by combining it with the instrumental case the meaning is
brought to the hearer twice. The double categorization makes it sound
like a tautology and is unacceptable. That is the reason why in all nor-
mal worlds you will not hear utterances like (10). This has conse-
quences for the use of the nominative as well: if you want to character-
ize a person as a Dane, you will have to use the adjective nastojaščij
‘real’ together with the nominative case. This means that what is an
important distinction inside nouns is blocked inside the case system,
but reappears on the surface as something else. In (11) Pushkin is
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categorized as a poet and since this is known to every Russian person,
it is felt as being impolite to say such a thing - as if the speaker could
not presuppose such knowledge. In this specific case you would nor-
mally use the nominative case and in that way bring some new infor-
mation into the utterance, viz. he was the poet per se. The distinction
between the nominative and instrumental case is also found inside
adjectives. The semantics is the same, i.e. the nominative case charac-
terizes a person or a thing, whereas the instrumental case categorizes.
However, when the adjective functions as a predicative determiner, i.e.
when it occurs in a secondary nexus, the distinction in case marking
becomes a text linguistic distinction between foregrounding and
backgrounding (see 12 and 13).
(12) On-a vyš-l-a iz vod-y mokr-aja ‘She went wet out of the water’.
hum-F go-pret-F out water-gen wet-nom
(13) On-a vyš-l-a iz vod-y mokr-oj ‘She went wet out of the water’.
hum-F go-pret-F out water-gen wet-instr
The nominative foregrounds the state situation where the female person
is described as being wet, while the instrumental case backgrounds it -
this means that the state situation where she is out of the water is
foregrounded instead (see also Timberlake 1986). As we can imagine,
foregrounding and backgrounding necessarily implies a certain kind of
harmony between various parts of information given by the preceding
or the following utterance. For instance, it is completely coherent to use
the nominative case in (14), but not completely harmonic to use the
instrumental.
(14) On-Ø čut’ ne umer-Ø v bol’nic-e, a segodnja on-Ø vernu-l-sja
zdorov-yj/?zdorov-ym
hum-M bit not die-pret in hospital-L, but today hum-M return-
pret-refl healthy-N/-I
It is stated that a certain person almost died in a hospital and that - what
is one way or the other a little bit surprising to the speaker - he returned
healthy today. In this case it is more easy to see “he is almost dead at the
hospital” and “he is healthy now” (i.e. the result of the foregrounding
function of the nominative case) as harmonic because they talk about
the same topic (to be dead vs. alive), whereas “he is almost dead at the
hospital” and “he is home now” (i.e. the result of the backgrounding
function of the instrumental case) seems to be disharmonic, since the
hearer feels that some information is left out (i.e. that he got better and
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therefore later could take home). The backgrounding function of the
instrumental case is evident in (15).
(15) Ona vyšla iz vody mokrojinstr (mokrajanom) i prostudi-l-as’ ‘She
went wet out of the water and cought a cold’
In (15) the nominative case would be out of the question - it is
inappropriate from the point of view of the speaker’s message - since it
would focus on the information that she is wet thus requiring the focus
to be continued in the following discourse (in the shape of a description
of her looks). In contrast to this stands the instrumental case which
backgrounds the information - it is appropriate in the given context. In
that way the state where she is wet can function as the reason why she
caught a cold, and the entire utterance thus gives the right associations
to the hearer (cf. Karaulov 1993).
The same phenomenon is found in aspectual usage and is
documented in an interesting experiment with 100 Russian informants
(see Svedova 1984). They were all given one hundred utterances
including a certain context (either in the shape of a preceding utterance
or in the shape of a following one) and were asked to choose aspect, i.e.
the perfective or imperfective aspect. Let us take the following
utterance as an illustrative example (see 16).
(16) Éta stat’ja perevedena nebrežno. Kto eë perevël (pf)/perevodil
(ipf)?
‘This article is very clumsily translated. Who did (pf)/did (ipf)
the translation?’
It turned out that 97 pct of the informants marked the perfective aspect
ungrammatical, while 3 pct of them found it was grammatical and even
more preferable than the corresponding imperfective form. Both forms
are in fact grammatical. This is a question of foregrounding vs.
backgrounding of information or once again an instantiation of the
phenomenon “communication-overrules-grammar”. The perfective
aspect foregrounds the state “The translation exists on world-location”
and backgrounds the activity “Somebody produced an activity with that
intention”. Since the passive sentence asserts that the translation is
clumsy and thereby presupposes the physical existence of the transla-
tion itself, the result is that there is mismatch in the information pack-
aging. If something appears to be presupposed in a preceding affirma-
tive utterance and against this background is asserted (i.e. fore-
grounded) in the following question, we get a tautological statement
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inside the question and the perfective aspect is judged ill-sounding - we
feel that we are not getting further, but have stepped back. There is too
much harmony between the two utterances. The imperfective utterance
shifts topic, i.e. it introduces the question of a translator by fore-
grounding the activity description and in that way introduces something
new so that the hearer will feel that we in a way are getting further.
4. Concluding remarks
I have just attempted to outline the fundamentals of a new type of
grammar, called Mental Grammar, which operates with a sharp
distinction between language, mind, and reality. It rejects the existence
of UG by splitting it up into three different linguistic supertypes. On the
background of various unexplained data from the Russian language,
which is a so-called reality-based language, I tried to demonstrate that
such type of grammar lives more up to what was called modern
standards than previous grammars which are oriented only towards the
hearer, rely almost totally on written sources, and lack a contrastive
element.
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